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2A mechanism with low direct cost of use may be preferred to alternatives implementing 
more efficient allocations. We show this experimentally by giving pairs of subjects the 
option to agree on a single average price for a sequence of trades – in effect pooling 
several small bargains into a larger one. We make pooling costly by tying it to some 
inefficient trades, but subjects nevertheless reveal strong tendencies to pool, particularly 
when more bargains remain to be struck and when bargaining is face to face. The results 
suggest that implementation costs could play a significant role in the use of many 
common trading practices, including the employment relationship. 
COSTS OF IMPLEMENTATION: BARGAINING COSTS VERSUS 
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
Abstract
3The original literature on comparative economic systems evaluates mechanisms in 
terms of their ability to implement efficient allocations as well as the costs of required 
activities, such as information gathering, communication, and bargaining (e., g. Hayek, 
1945; Hurwicz, 1959). Yet, the latter class of costs plays almost no role in modern 
thinking on mechanism and market design. Challenging this practice, we provide 
experimental evidence, showing that players trade-off efficiency for costs by accepting 
less efficient allocations in exchange for fewer rounds of bargaining. 
In our studies, subjects have the option to agree on a single average price for a 
sequence of small trades – in effect pooling several bargains into one. The experiments
impose no artificial bargaining costs; subjects’ only gain from pooling is to reduce the 
amount of bargaining they have to do. In spite of this, many pairs of subjects agree to 
pool, even at the cost of completing some inefficient trades. The tendency to pool is 
stronger when the associated allocative inefficiencies are smaller, when more rounds of 
bargaining are “saved”, and when bargaining is face-to-face. On the other hand, the time 
saved by pooling does not appear to be a significant factor. Agreements on pooling prices 
are preceded by a larger number of offers and counter-offers than agreements on 
individual prices. Part of this is due to the fact that pairs who eventually choose to pool 
make more offers than pairs who never pool, even when negotiating individual prices.
Beyond suggesting that bargaining costs are positive, a more specific implication 
of our results is that these costs are sub-additive (since subjects prefer to bargain over a 
single pooled price rather than over a sequence of individual prices). Sub-additivity has 
strong intuitive appeal and is consistent with the sense that most people would prefer to 
negotiate a single $300 deal instead of thirty $10 deals. 
Sub-additive bargaining costs are to bargaining what menucosts (Mankiw, 1985; 
Levy et al., 1997; Zbaracki et al.  2004) are to posted prices. They can help us explain the
widely observed practice of using a single price for any element in relatively large sets of 
heterogeneous items: college tuition typically does not depend on courses taken, haircuts
can be “as you like it”, and stays at all-inclusive resorts can take many forms. While these 
practices have been largely ignored by economists, the US Supreme Court has defended 
I. INTRODUCTION
4them as rational responses to sub-additive pricing costs (Broadcast Music Inc. vs. 
Columbia Broadcast System, 1978). The American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers, which license the work of individual artists in the music industry, charges a 
blanket fee to bars, radio stations, etc. When the Columbia Broadcast System challenged 
this practice, the court found in favor of the defendant, arguing that “…a blanket license 
was an obvious necessity if the thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual 
impossibility, were to be avoided.” Wernerfelt (1997) used similar arguments to explain 
the absence of ongoing bargaining between employees and their bosses.1 Our 
experiments speak directly to this by testing the extent to which subjects are willing to 
forego surplus in order to avoid ongoing bargaining.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We present a reduced form 
model in Section II, the experimental design in Section III, and the results in Section IV. 
The paper closes with a brief discussion in Section V. The experimental instructions can 
be found in an Appendix along with a possible micro-foundation for the model and some 
more detailed data.
To demonstrate the existence and sub-additivity of bargaining costs, we will 
derive some general conditions under which bargainers will prefer to pool a set of
bargains. To keep the exposition as simple as possible, we will use a reduced form model 
of sequential bargaining. A possible foundation for this reduced form is analyzed in
Appendix I.
We index a particular game by where is the total number of 
games the subjects can play. The seller’s costs and the buyer’s valuation are I.I.D. 
draws from two differentiable distributions, and , respectively. Expected gains from 
trade are ( - , and the expected magnitude of positive gains from trade is
?? ( -
                                                  
1 The author went further and contrasted the employment relationship with independent 
contracting based on whether the agreement gives the buyer control over production methods. “A contract 
on finished goods gives the buyer no right to ask for different production methods as long as the product 
specifications are met. The supplier is responsible only for “what” is done, not for “how”, and he is [thus] 
not an employee.” (p. 500). So an agreement to pool is an employment relationship if the scope of the 
agreement is broad enough to include different production methods. Whether or not this is considered a 
satisfactory rationale for the existence of firms, it explains a prominent aspect of behavior within them.
II. A REDUCED FORM MODEL
n = 1, 2, …N, N
cn vn
Fc Fv
G = ??v c) dFvdFc
G+ = v>c v c) dFvdFc.
5The analysis of the last game (game ) is straightforward. If the gains from trade 
are positive, both players have positive expected payoffs. Following the above, these 
payoffs sum to – , where = 0 are bargaining costs. If the gains from trade are 
negative, the players will immediately agree not to trade and the payoffs sum to zero.
Consider the next to last game under the assumption that the players engage in sequential 
bargaining. If gains from trade are positive, payoffs sum to – , where = 
0, and if the gains from trade are negative, payoffs sum to zero. Since contracting is 
sequential, the expected payoffs from the last two games are – + –
Suppose instead that the players decide to pool the last two games. The expected payoffs 
from the current game are – , where are the bargaining costs associated 
with agreeing on the pooled contract The sub-additivity of bargaining costs is captured 
by the assumption that -   + Since pooling commits the players to 
trade in the last game, the expected payoffs from that are . So pooling is preferable if
– + – = – + .                            
Given that bargaining costs are sub-additive, we can work backwards to see that pooling 
becomes less and less attractive as more periods go by. In sum, gives the following 
We test this proposition in a series of comparisons, involving seven experimental 
treatments.
Two hundred and twenty-four students, 101 women and 123 males, aged 18 to 51 
years (M=23.16, SD=4.29), participated in the experiment, which was conducted at the 
Computer Lab for Experimental Research (CLER) at Harvard Business School, the 
Behavioral Research Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of 
Vienna, Austria, and the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Germany. Experimental 
sessions lasted between 40 and 50 minutes, and participants earned, on average, $15.04 
(SD=2.49), including a show-up fee of $10. 
N
vN – cN bN bN
vN-1 – cN-1 bN-1 bN-1
vN-1 – cN-1 bN-1 G+ bN.
vN-1 – cN-1 pN-1 pN-1
. 
pN-1 [bN 1, bN bN-1). 
G
                     vN-1 – cN-1 bN-1 G+ bN vN-1 – cN-1 pN-1 G (1)
(1)
: Pooling is more attractive when more bargaining costs are saved, 
when fewer inefficient trades are included, and when more periods remain. 
Î
Proposition
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
6Upon arrival in the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to dyads. Within each 
dyad, one of the subjects was assigned the role of a buyer, the other the role of a seller. 
Participants bargained over fictitious commodities over several bargaining games via a 
computer interface (see details below). Participants received written instructions (see 
Appendix II), and were asked to complete a short quiz that tested their understanding of 
the instructions. The experiment started only after all participants had answered all the 
quiz items correctly. 
In order to be as conservative as possible, we do not impose any artificial 
bargaining costs, thereby allowing subjects to reveal their ‘true’ preferences. Several 
important classes of bargaining costs are thus absent, including inefficiencies resulting 
from lingering negative sentiments (Hart and Moore, 2008) and costs incurred during 
attempts to gather pre-bargaining intelligence about the opponent’s reservation price.3
The only costs relevant to the experiment are those incurred during the bargaining 
process itself. These are out-of-equilibrium costs in some models (Rubinstein, 1982), but 
not in all (Watson, 1998; Smith and Stacchetti, 2003; Dewatripont and Tirole, 2005). In 
this paper, we will attempt to identify some factors bearing on the magnitude and nature 
of these bargaining costs.
At the beginning of each bargaining game, valuations for buyers and costs for 
sellers were randomly drawn from uniform distributions, which were common 
knowledge to both parties. On top of that, subjects had complete information in each 
game about the realized valuations and costs of both buyers and sellers (see A in Figure 
1). Time is continuous, allowing either player to make an offer (bid or ask) at any time 
(regardless of who made the previous offer). To allow for the pooling of bargains, 
participants could submit their own offers for the current bargaining game only (see B)
and/or for the current plus all remaining games (see B’). These offers were publicly listed 
(see C and C’). Alternatively, participants could accept standing bargaining offers (D and
                                                  
2 See Camerer (2003) for an overview of experimental studies of bargaining.
3 Since better-informed bargainers achieve better results (Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer, 
2006), it is rational to invest in information search in anticipation of bargaining (Wernerfelt, 2008). 
Similarly, players may refrain from suggesting improved trades in order to withhold information about such 
opportunities to protect their own future bargaining power (Simester and Knez, 2002). A survey by 
found that purchasing managers spend 25% of their time “Preparing bids” and 
“Researching Prices”.
2
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7D’). Finally, the recipient of a bid/ask could accept it, make a counter-offer, wait for a 
better offer, or unilaterally abort the current game (thus moving the pair to the next game, 
see E).
For example, in Figure 1, the buyer submitted offers for the current game of 75, 
76, and 77 Experimental Currency Units (ECU)4, and offers for the current and all 
remaining games of 71 and 72 ECU. The most attractive (since lowest) standing offer 
was 85 ECU for the current game and 110 ECU for the current plus all remaining games.
Participants’ profits were the difference between the valuation and the accepted price for
buyers and the difference between the accepted price and the costs for sellers. If 
participants passed on a game, the profits of both parties were zero for that particular 
game.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
We run seven studies in which we manipulate the inefficiency cost entailed by 
pooling, the number of games, and the anonymity of bargaining. In each study, 16 dyads
of buyers and sellers bargain over fictitious items (see Appendix II for detailed 
instructions).
Study 1: Existence and sub-additivity
The existence, and sub–additivity, of bargaining costs is tested in all the studies, 
and also in the first, which serves as the base treatment (BT) for later comparisons. In 
BT, subjects bargain over 30 games with some inefficient trades.5 Buyers’ valuations are 
drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 95 to 135 ECU, and sellers’ costs from a 
uniform distribution ranging from 65 to 105 ECU. In this treatment, trade is efficient with 
                                                  
4  One ECU was equivalent to 1 Cent in five of our seven treatments and equivalent to 6 Cents in 
two treatments.
5 In order to maximize the intended similarity with the employment situation, players remained 
with their partner throughout. A drawback of this is that we have to wave our hand at repeated game 
arguments. However, these could be avoided by re-shuffling all continuing (non-pooling) players after each 
round. 
IV. STUDIES
8probability 31/32. If only efficient trades are made, expected gains per game are 30.1, 
whereas they are 30 if all trades are made. So the expected cost of pooling is 3, or about 
.33 % of total surplus. We thus expect pooling by pairs for which the savings in 
bargaining costs are above 3 ECU.
The purpose of the next two studies is to check the validity of the bargaining cost 
interpretation by seeing if the extent of pooling varies with the costs in terms of 
inefficient trades. 
Study 2: High costs of pooling
In the second study, the inefficient treatment (IT), we increase the costs of 
pooling by including more inefficient trades. In IT, subjects bargain again over 30 games. 
Buyers’ valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 90 to 140 ECU, 
and sellers’ costs from a uniform distribution ranging from 60 to 110 ECU. So in this 
treatment, trade is efficient with probability 23/25. If only efficient trades are made, 
expected gains per period are 30.53, whereas they are 30 if all trades are made. The 
expected cost of pooling is 15.99, or about 1.78 % of total surplus. We thus expect that
fewer pairs pool in IT than in BT.
Study 3: No costs of pooling
In the third study, the efficiency treatment (ET), all trades are efficient. Subjects 
again bargain over 30 games. Buyers’ valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution,
ranging from 100 to 130 ECU, and sellers’ costs from a uniform distribution, ranging 
from 70 to 100 ECU. In this treatment, the expected gains per game are 30, and the cost 
of pooling is zero. We thus expect that more pairs pool in ET than in BT.
Together, Studies 2 and 3 
support the bargaining cost interpretation by suggesting that subjects trade-off the saved 
bargaining costs against the imposed costs of pooling. To facilitate comparison, the 
                                                  
6 Mann-Whitney z-value of 1.91, significant at the 5% level in a one-tailed test comparing the two 
distributions of settlement periods.
7 Mann-Whitney z-value of 2.18, significant at the 5% level in a one-tailed test.
We find that 9 of the 16 pairs pool.
Consistent with this, we find that only 3 (9) of the 16 
pairs pool in IT (BT).6
Consistent with 
this, we find that 12 (9) of the 16 pairs pool in ET (BT).7
9results of Studies 1, 2, and 3 are jointly listed in Table 1 below. The last column in the 
Table reports the average period in which the pairs that eventually pooled chose to do so
(the complete distribution of pooling periods can be found in Appendix III). In theory, all 
pooling should take place in period one, so the numbers reflect that it took the players a 
few rounds to understand and agree. (Since only three pairs pool in the Inefficient 
treatment, it is hard to read too much into the apparently faster pooling.)
The Tendency to Pool for Increasing Costs of Pooling
Efficient T 12/16 = 75% 2.92
Base T 9/16 = 56.25% 7.44
Inefficient T 3/16 = 18.75% 4.33
Beyond existence, the results suggest a distribution of saved bargaining costs with 
per-pair totals being zero for 4/16, between zero and three ECU for 3/16, between three 
and sixteen ECU for 6/16, and above sixteen ECU for 3/16. 
In the next two treatments, we manipulate the costs and benefits of pooling in 
different ways, by making individual bargains more important and by reducing the 
number of bargains saved by pooling.
Study 4: Higher stakes8
The purpose of the fourth study is to test whether pairs are less likely to pool if 
the stakes are higher. Consequently, in this treatment, we increase the stakes by a factor 
of six. We refer to this treatment as the high-stakes treatment (HT). In HT, the exchange 
rate is increased by a factor of six – from one to six cents. To make this study as 
                                                  
8 Studies 1-3 use American subjects, while studies 4-7 use European subjects. Common belief 
might suggest that the latter are more patient, but the data do not show any pattern to support this.
Table 1
Treatment Number and percent Average pooling period
10
informative as possible, we use the same value and cost distributions as in ET, the 
experiment with most pooling. So all trades are efficient and expected gains per game are 
180. We expect that fewer pairs pool in HT than in ET. 
.9 On the other hand, it does not appear that 
players take longer time to reach agreements – certainly not six times as long.
Study 5: Fewer bargains
The purpose of the fifth study is to test whether pairs are less likely to pool if the 
number of bargaining games thus avoided is lower. To keep the overall stakes the same 
as those in BT, we increase the stakes to the level of HT reduce the number of games
by the same factor. We refer to this treatment as the shortened treatment (ST). Aiming to 
make this study as informative as possible, we again use the same value and cost 
distributions as in ET, the experiment with most pooling. In ST, subjects bargain over 5 
games, but the exchange rate is the same as in HT, such that the total expected profits are 
the same as in ET. Also, the duration of the screen with the profit feedback in between 
games is increased to keep total bargaining time roughly constant across the various
treatments. We expect that fewer pairs pool in ST than in ET.
.10 (This number is possibly biased 
downwards because it usually takes subjects several rounds of bargaining to establish and 
calibrate the benefits of pooling.) So the tendency to pool appears to be very sensitive to 
the number of bargains thus avoided. To facilitate comparison, the results of Studies 3, 4, 
and 5 are presented jointly in Table 2 below.
                                                  
9 Mann-Whitney z-value of 2.07, significant at the 5% level in a one-tailed test.
10 Mann-Whitney z-value of 3.99, significant at the 5% level in a one-tailed test.
Consistent with this, we find that 
only 8 (12) of the 16 pairs pool in HT (ET)
and
Consistent with this, we 
find that only 1 (12) of the 16 pairs pool in ST (ET)
11
The Tendency to Pool for Different Costs and Benefits of Pooling
Efficient T 12/16 = 75% 2.92
High-stakes T 8/16 = 50% 8.38
Short T 1/16 = 6.25% (3 of 5)
We now report on two studies aimed at identifying the nature of bargaining costs.
Study 6: No time savings
The purpose of the sixth study is to evaluate the role of time savings in bargaining 
costs. In most of our studies, pooling pairs saved about ten minutes each and one could 
conjecture that these were the bargaining costs involved. To test this conjecture, we 
ran an additional experiment, a modified Base Treatment informing players that no-one 
could leave before all pairs were done. We refer to this treatment as BT’. While we 
would expect fewer pairs to pool in BT’ than in BT, we find no difference:
. So it does not appear that time savings are a major component of 
bargaining costs in our experiments. To facilitate comparison, the results of Studies 1 and 
6 are presented together in Table 3 below.
The Role of Time-savings in the Tendency to Pool
Base T 9/16 = 56.25% 7.44
Base T’- no time savings 9/16 = 56.25% 7.67
Table 2
Treatment Number and percent Average pooling period
Table 3
Treatment Number and percent Average pooling period
only
9 (9) of the 16 
pairs pool in BT’ (BT)
12
Study 7: No anonymity
The purpose of the seventh study is to investigate whether anonymity reduces 
bargaining costs. We do this by allowing the bargainers to identify their opponents, in 
effect going from anonymous to face-to-face bargaining. The manipulation relies on the 
intuitive sense that negative interactions are more painful when conducted face-to-face 
(e.g. Joinson, 2004).11 In our face-to-face interaction treatment (FT), subjects sit in pairs 
next to the computer terminal, negotiate in free format, and enter all their offers and 
contracts directly into the PC. They once again bargain over 30 games with some 
inefficient trades.12 To make this study as informative as possible, we use the same value 
and cost distributions as in IT, the treatment with the least incidence of pooling. As in IT, 
trade is efficient with probability 23/25. If only efficient trades are made, expected gains 
per period are 30.53, whereas they are 30 if all trades are made. The expected cost of 
pooling is thus again 15.99, or about 1.78% of total surplus. We expect that more pairs
pool in FT than in IT. So 
it appears that anonymity significantly eases the pain of bargaining.
Because this setting is closer to many real situations, the results may be more 
representative of many actual cases. This suggests that bargaining costs, at least partially,
capture social or communication costs. Consistent with most people’s negative feelings 
about haggling with car salesmen, subjects in our experiment may have associated 
negative utility with the bargaining process itself. To facilitate comparison, the results of 
Studies 2 and 7 are presented together in Table 4 below.
                                                  
11 Prior research indicates that face-to-face bargaining involves higher rates of soft negotiation 
tactics, like concessions, active listening, promises and information revelation, and lower rates of hard 
negotiation tactics, such as threats, intimidation, and take-it-or-leave-it offers, when compared to e-
negotiation (Galin, Gross, and Gosalker, 2007).
12 Compared to the other treatments, this design simultaneously introduces verbal and visual 
communication. It might be informative to look at intermediate cases with one type of communication only. 
13 Mann-Whitney z-value of 2.01, significant at the 5% level in a one-tailed test.
Consistent with this, we find that 10 (3) pairs pool in FT (IT).13
     
13
The Role of Anonymity in the Tendency to Pool
Inefficient T 3/16 = 18.75% 4.33
Face to face T 10/16 = 62.5% 9
Other results: number of offers exchanged and pooling prices
We can get additional insights into the nature of bargaining costs by comparing 
the number of offers exchanged between pooling and non-pooling pairs. We find, not 
surprisingly, that 
14 However, consistent with the notion of sub-additivity, the number 
of offers does not go up in proportion to the number of bargains pooled. In fact, there is 
evidence that part of the effect is due to selection. When we compare one period
agreements between pairs that pool in later periods against similar agreements between 
pairs that never pool, we find that 
15 So consistent with the relative unimportance of time, it 
does not seem to be the case that the pooling pairs seek to reduce the amount of time 
spent bargaining by conceding early. Rather, the pooling pairs are those for which 
bargaining is more cumbersome. These results are reported in Table 5 in which the 
treatments are listed in order of decreasing incidence of pooling.
                                                  
14 Aggregating on a treatment-by-treatment basis, the eventually pooling pairs made 0.3 more 
offers per bargain when they negotiated pooling prices compared to when they negotiated one period 
prices. 
15 Aggregating on a treatment-by-treatment basis, the eventually pooling pairs made 1.7 more 
offers per bargain when the negotiated one period prices compared to pairs that never pool. (This difference 
goes down to 0.1 if we focus on the first few periods only, but it is certainly not the case that the eventually 
pooling pairs concede early to avoid bargaining.) 
Table 4
Treatment Number and percent Average pooling period
pooling agreements most often are negotiated more carefully than non-
pooling agreements.
eventually pooling pairs exchange more offers before 
agreeing on non-pooling prices.
14
Number of Offers in One Period Negotiations and Pooling Prices 
ET(12) 7.7 5.5 1.4 99
FT(10) 7.3 4.9 3.4 99
BT(9) 2.5 3.7 3.5 102
BT’(9) 1.4 3.8 3.0 100
HT(8) 4.9 2.6 2.7 101
IT(3) 2.7 9.4 4.2 105
ST(1) 11 7.7 9.2 95
The Table also reports the average pooling prices. As expected these are all close 
to 100.16
In the tradition of Coase (1937), we have identified a cost of using the price 
mechanism and have shown how it can lead subjects to agree on average rather than 
individual prices when the items traded are many, small, and idiosyncratic. Consistent 
with theoretical expectation, we found that pooling is more likely when more bargains 
remain to be struck, when the stakes per deal are lower, when the costs resulting from 
                                                  
16 It is perhaps understandable that subjects are reluctant to agree on a pooled bargain in the very 
first period, before they have a clear sense of the workings of the process. However, it is surprising that so 
many pairs wait several more periods before settling. One possibility is that subjects use the first several 
periods to learn about the environment and their opponent (in the spirit of Yildiz, 2004).
Table 5
Treatment
(Number 
of poolers)
Mean number of 
pre-agreement 
offers (pooling 
prices).
Mean number of 
pre-agreement 
offers (one period 
prices): pairs
pooling later
Mean number of 
pre-agreement
offers (one period 
prices): pairs that 
never pool
Average 
pooling
price
V. DISCUSSION
15
inefficient trades are lower, and when the bargainers come face to face. The underlying 
bargaining costs, and the extent to which they are sub-additive, were not created by the 
experimenters. They were driven by naturally felt costs of the subjects themselves.
Since our study is the first attempt to look at the behavior of bargaining costs, it 
leaves many questions unanswered. For example, what happens if we vary the extent to 
which the individual trades are idiosyncratic? If the thirty trades consist of ten times three
(cost, value) pairs, might the players negotiate a price for each when it first appears and 
then use this as a price list on all future occurrences? Another possibility is to expand on 
the idea from the face-to-face treatment and compare the magnitudes of bargaining costs 
in different settings. It would be particularly interesting to replicate the results in a 
country with extensive retail bargaining.
It is easiest to make a case for bargaining costs in the context of the folk theorem -
when more than one mechanism can implement the first best allocation and many rounds 
of bargaining are called for. However, since subjects gave up some allocative efficiency 
in return for less bargaining, our experiments suggest that bargaining costs can matter in 
a much wider range of circumstances. If this is true, our results have important 
implications for institutional comparisons and market design.
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Figure 1: Schematic screen-shot of the bargaining environment for the buyer
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Strategic bargaining and sub-additive bargaining costs
A problem facing experimental work on bargaining is that the typical results, 
while consistent with casual observation of actual bargaining processes, are very different 
from those predicted by most published theory (Ochs and Roth, 1989). In particular, there 
is a dearth of theories predicting the widely observed pattern of alternating offers, 
culminating in delayed agreement. Since the “Aspirational Bargaining “ model of Smith 
and Stacchetti (2003) is one of the few models to allow both delay and multiple offers, 
we will nest our discussion in that.17
The “Aspirational Bargaining” model exhibits a plethora of mixed strategy 
equilibria based on the classical idea that bargainers have endogenously varying 
aspiration levels (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960). Time is continuous and a bargainer in 
equilibrium is indifferent between (i) taking an offer or not, and between (ii) making an 
offer or waiting for the opponent to do so. The magnitude of offers, and the intensities 
with which they are made and taken, depend on the aspiration levels of the bargainers, 
and the model admits a lot of degrees of freedom in specifying how these levels change 
over time. As a result, there are many equilibria, but all of them share a number of 
appealing properties, particularly the expectation of delays and multiple offers.
Smith and Stacchetti (2003) look at a bargain over a single unit with discounted 
payoffs. Since we are looking at cases in which bargains are small, but many, we will 
introduce to denote the number of units divided in an individual bargain. Other than 
this, we follow the original model and notation closely. A proposal offers the 
receiver gross payoff , while the proposer would get and all such offers must be 
immediately accepted or rejected. The players are denoted and and the payoffs to a 
pure strategy profile are if made the final offer 
at and accepted it, (and   if made the offer). To keep things simple, 
we assume that neither player has any outside options. A behavior strategy profile 
is a subgame perfect equilibrium if for any history; is a best reply to , and vice versa. 
    Aspiration values can be thought of as state variables measuring current 
expectations about future payoffs, ignoring past bargaining costs. They sum to one or less 
                                                  
17 Other possibilities might be Abreu and Gul (2000), Abreu and Pearce (2007), and Yildiz (2004).
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and change values every time an offer is made. Suppose that offers have been made so 
far and that the current aspiration values are = ( ). If player makes an offer 
and player rejects it, aspiration values jump to where the function is 
decreasing and may depend on . Similarly, if player offers and player rejects, 
aspiration values go to The functions and are determined in 
equilibrium. 
We will look at strategies that are stationary and Markovian in the sense that they 
are independent of the time elapsed since that last offer (or the start of the game) and 
dependent only on current aspirations. So for each state (pair of aspiration values) inter-
offer times follow exponential distributions. For a given initial state , equilibria in this 
class, for each state, can be summarized by 
- a pair of parameters describing the intensity with which offers are made.
- a pair of distribution functions from which the offers are drawn.
- a pair of functions giving the probabilities that offer is accepted.
- a pair of functions updating aspirations after an offer of is rejected.
The quintuble has to satisfy two constraints to sustain the mixing. First, 
each player has to be indifferent between making an offer and waiting for the opponent to 
do so. If player contemplates making an offer, this means that
Second, each player has to be indifferent between all offers. If player makes an offer, 
this means that, for all in the support of 
Since no constraints are necessary beyond these, we are left with a lot of degrees 
of freedom (equilibria). Suppose, for example, that each offer concedes a fixed fraction 
of future surplus, such that In this case tells us 
that the expected inter-offer time is: 
Since the ’s are scaled by , the expected delay,
is the same for all 
m
wm w1m , w2m 1
x, 2 (s?2(x), sx) ?2(  )
wm 2 x, 1
(sx, s?1( x)). ?1(  ) ?2(  )
w0
(?1, ?2)
(µ1, µ2)
a1(x), a2(x) x 
?1(x), ?2(x) x
(w0, ?, µ, a, ?)
1
                w1 = sEx2(w1, w2) ?2(w1, w2)/[?2(w1, w2) + r]                                              (A1)
1
x µ,
                                   w1 = a2(w, x)s(1-x) + (1 - a2(w, x))s?1(w, x)                                (A2)
? [0, 1] sx2 = w1 + ?(s – w1 – w2). (A1)
                                           1/?2(w1, w2) = ?(s – w1 – w2)/rw2                                       (A3)
w s
                       [? i=08 (1 - ? )i] ?(s – w1 – w2)/(2rw2) = (s – w1 – w2)/(2rw2),                  (A4)
s. So in this equilibrium, there are sub-additive bargaining (and 
advantages to pooling).
Î
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While this is the result we are looking for, it does not hold in all equilibria of all 
versions of the model. We found it in a version where the cost of delay is larger for larger 
stakes. Suppose instead that long delays are costly because of opportunity costs of time 
and aversion to the bargaining process itself. In this case one could reasonable argue that 
the cost of delay is linear in time, such that the payoffs to a pure strategy profile, , are 
if made the final offer at and accepted it. In this 
case the analog of the incentive constraint is
If we again assume that each offer concedes a fixed fraction of future surplus, 
such that tells us that the expected inter-offer time is 
proportional to the size of the pie being divided: 
So the expected delay,
is the same whether or not bargains are pooled, and bargaining costs are not sub-additive
In sum, players in the Aspirational Bargaining model incur positive bargaining 
cost that may or may not be sub-additive
s
p(s ) =[(1-x)s – ct, xs - ?t], ? > 0, 1 t 2
(A1)
                         w1 = sEx2(w1, w2) - ?/?2(w1, w2).                                                           (A5)
? [0, 1]
sx2 = w1 + ?(s – w1 – w2), (A5)
                                           1/?2(w1, w2) = ?(s – w1 – w2)/?                                             (A6)
                          [? 08 (1 - ? )i] ?(s – w1 – w2)/(2?) = (s – w1 – w2)/(2?),                        (A7)
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In this experiment you will bargain over the price of 30 fictitious commodities. In each 
round a seller and a buyer can trade one unit of a different commodity, so there will be 30 
bargaining rounds corresponding to the 30 commodities. You were assigned the role of a 
and will face the same seller in each of the 30 rounds. 
Buyers and sellers learn their valuations and costs for the commodity at the beginning of 
each round. Both parties are informed about valuations and costs. The profits from 
trade are
For you (buyer): Profit = Valuation – Price
For the seller: Profit = Price – Cost 
Instead of trading, you and/or the seller may also pass on a round. In this case, profits of 
both of you will be 0.
Your valuations are determined randomly at the beginning of each round. They are drawn 
from a uniform distribution, ranging from 100 to 130. Drawing from a uniform 
distribution implies that each value between 100 and 130 is likely to occur. So 
although the average valuation will be 115, valuations of 100 or 130 are just as likely.
The seller’s costs are also determined randomly in each round. They too are drawn from a 
uniform distribution, this one ranging from 70 to 100. So while the average cost is 85, 
costs of 70 or 100 are just as likely. 
Consider the following examples:
1. Assume that in this round your valuation is 120, the seller’s cost is 80, and that 
you agreed to a price of 110. Your profit is then 120 (valuation) – 110 (price) = 
10, and the profit of the seller is 110 (price) – 80 (cost) = 30. 
APPENDIX II
Sample Instructions to Subjects in the Buyer Role of BT
Buyer
both
equally
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2. Assume that in this round your valuation is 110, the seller’s cost is 95, and that 
you agreed to a price of 115. Then, your profit is 110 (valuation) – 115 (price) =   
-5. The profit of the seller is 115 (price) – 95 (price) = 20.
3. Assume that in this round your valuation is 100, the seller’s cost is 85, and that 
you pass on the round. Then, your profit and the profit of the seller are both 0. 
You can bargain over prices in two ways: on a basis or on a 
basis. That is, you can bargain 30 times over 30 different prices (for example 80, 
100, 70, etc.) for the 30 commodities or 1 time over an “average” price (for example 80) 
which then will apply to all 30 commodities. If in any round you agree on a once-and-for-
all price, the experiment ends right there. If you agree on a price for the current round, or 
if you pass on the current round, you proceed to the next round. This continues until all 
30 rounds are finished.
In order to determine your final payoffs at the end of the experiment, we will sum your 
profits over the 30 rounds. Each experimental unit is worth $0.01, such that 100 units 
equal $1. 
round-per-round once-and-
for-all 
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Please take now a look at the screen-shot that you will find on the desk next to the 
keyboard. The screen-shot shows how the screen is organized, how bargaining is done, 
and what options are available to you in each bargaining round. We will now explain the 
various features of the screen in detail.
Below the letter A on the screen-shot you are informed about your role as a buyer. 
You also learn what your valuation (115) and the seller’s cost (80) are in this round. 
Next to the letter B on the screen you can a buy offer to the seller for the 
current round only. You simply enter your offer in the input field, , and click the 
button . In this particular example the buyer submitted an offer of 77. 
Next to the letter B’ you can enter a once-and-for-all offer, which is valid for the 
current and all subsequent rounds. In this particular example the buyer submitted an offer 
of 72.
You can only submit offers, i.e., a higher than your last offer. If you 
previously offered to buy the commodity for 71, you have to improve your offer by 
submitting an offer that is higher than 71. 
Next to the letter C you see how your buy offers are listed on the screen. The offers 
are ordered, such that the most attractive offer – for the seller – is the offer that is listed 
last. In this example, the buyer offered 75, and then improved the offer to 76, and 77. The 
current available offer to the seller, valid for this round only, is 77.
Next to the letter C’ you find your once-and-for-all sell offers, which are valid for the 
current and all subsequent rounds.
The Screen
A:
B: 
B’:
C:
C’:
submit
Price
Make offer
improving 
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Next to the letter D you can find the currently available sell offers, submitted by the 
seller. These offers are ordered and the best offer is highlighted. 
In this example, the seller submitted an initial offer of 89, and then improved the offer to 
88, 87 and 85, respectively. The currently best offer – for you – is 85. If you decide to 
accept the offer, you simply click on the button . 
Next to the letter D’ you find the once-and-for-all buy offers, submitted by the buyer, 
which are valid for the current and all subsequent rounds.
If you decide to pass on the current round, you can click the button, . In 
this case, you will go to the next bargaining round.
In summary, you have 5 options to choose from in each round. You can
1. Make a new offer for the current round ( on the screen-shot).
2. Make a new once-and-for-all offer ( ).
3. Accept the seller’s most recent offer for the current round ( ).
4. Accept the seller’s most recent once-and-for-all offer ( ).
5. Pass on the current round ( ).
If you have no further questions, you will now participate in a short quiz, designed to test 
your understanding of the instructions. You are encouraged to use the instructions and the 
screen-shot to answer the quiz questions.
D:
D’:
E:
B 
B’
D
D’
E
Buy
Pass on Round
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Frequency of settling times by experimental treatment
Note: ET denotes the efficient treatment, IT the inefficient treatment, ST the short 
treatment, BT the baseline treatment, FT the face-to-face treatment, BT’ the baseline 
treatment with no time savings, and HT the high-stakes treatment.
APPENDIX III
